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Abstract 
Following a time period where a large number of refugees and immigrants had 
been received by Germany, the German minister of development proposed a new 
framework for Africa policy in the beginning of 2017 targeting the root causes of 
poverty and large migration flows. Titled Marshall Plan with Africa, the project 
aims to establish a new partnership between the continents, highlighting private 
investment, ratification of international trade agreements and 20 million new job- 
and vocational training opportunities for young people among other solutions. 
Yet, it is claimed to promote African solutions for African problems. This 
research looks at the Eurocentric discourse in the official policy document, guided 
by the research question does the Marshall Plan with Africa contain Eurocentric 
features?. It uses a customised framework for analysis building upon established 
methods of policy analysis, tying in theories of poststructuralism, eurocentrism 
and political myths. The study finds that although the policy document has a clear 
bias of Eurocentric institutionalism and Western values, it also contains 
components reflecting a more inclusive approach to development and agency. 
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1 Introduction 
There can be no understanding of development policies without a description of who the 
underdeveloped are, where they differ from the developed West, and how they can transform their 
identity. 
 (Lene Hansen 2006: xvi) 
 
In the wake of the high number of refugees and immigrants received by Germany 
in the last years, the German minister of development Dr. Gerd Müller proposed a 
new framework for Africa policy with the ambition to target root causes of 
poverty and large migration flows (Grefe & Köckritz 2017). 
The project was originally named Marshallplan für Afrika, an allusion to the 
extensive American foreign aid program received by Europe after the Second 
World War, but was revised slightly by the Federal Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (BMZ) shortly before it was published in the 
beginning of 2017 (ibid.). The published document, Marshall Plan with Africa, 
covers guidelines for a renewed economic partnership between Africa and Europe 
to diversify African economies in order to stimulate growth and create job 
opportunities (BMZ 2017a). It is in the core values of the framework that it builds 
upon African solutions to African problems, explaining the name change but 
raises a central question – does it? 
At the same time this new framework was announced, Germany held the G20 
presidency and pushed an Africa focused agenda, presenting the Marshall Plan 
with Africa under the name Compact with Africa. During 2017, there was also an 
EU-Africa summit held in the Ivory Coast set to address common interests and 
challenges, where the idea was presented and discussed between representatives 
from both continents (Wesel 2017). 
The project, still a blueprint and not passed policy, has been subject to both 
praise and criticism, many questioning the underlying motives and possibility to 
pursuit the extensive plan (Pelz 2017). China’s recent advances has without doubt 
stirred up uneasiness among Western countries, risking a decline in Western 
influence on the African continent (Poplak 2016). 
1.1 Purpose and Research Question 
As laid out above, the name of the policy document is a reference to the recovery 
plan post war Europe received from the U.S. after the Second World War; the 
matter arose in German politics after receiving a large number of refugees from 
North African and Middle Eastern countries; and it is a proposed partnership 
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aimed at boosting African economies based on Western capitalist measurements 
of development. These factors suggest that the policy blueprint would be based on 
Eurocentric values, nevertheless seeing as the country proposing it is European. 
The policy document does however claim to be based on African solutions to 
African problems, displaying a puzzle which makes the Marshall Plan with Africa 
an interesting foreign policy blueprint to examine closer. 
The purpose of this research is thus first and foremost to find out if the policy 
proposal does in fact build upon African solutions, or if it is biased by 
Eurocentrism. The research will be carried out by analysing the discourse in the 
Marshall Plan with Africa using a customised framework of poststructuralism, 
eurocentrism and political myth theories combined with an adapted method for 
policy analysis. Starting from a poststructural theoretical outset, this is of highest 
importance as language and discourse is viewed as constructing and 
reconstructing worldviews, knowledge and social hierarchies. Seeing as the 
project is ongoing, this research also aspires to lay the groundwork for a future 
policy revision recommendation on the matter. 
The research question guiding the analysis reads as follows: 
 
Does the Marshall Plan with Africa contain Eurocentric features? 
1.2 Background 
In order to situate the Marshall Plan with Africa in its political context, the paper 
will start off with a brief overview of recent German Africa policy leading up to 
the official blueprint published 2017 before presenting the theory, method and 
material used to analyse the content of the document. 
The BMZ started working on a specific approach to the African continent in 
2004 in order to improve the effects of German development cooperation with 
African countries (GIZ 2018). In the last few years, three framework reports from 
the BMZ has been published regarding the country’s new Africa policy. 
The framework report from 2014 acknowledges Africa as the priority 
continent for the BMZ and cover themes such as political stability, crisis and 
conflict, economic cooperation, vocational training, health, agriculture and private 
investment (BMZ 2014). The one from 2015 looks at the progress of the 2014 
document after one year, specifically at migration, youth employment, health, 
agriculture and partnership possibilities (BMZ 2015). Finally, the report published 
the year before the Marshall Plan with Africa blueprint focuses on crisis in the 
AU, strengthening economic development in North Africa, youth employment 
and vocational training, renewable energy and cooperation between BMZ and the 
German private sector (BMZ 2016). There is a clear trend among the themes, 
which are then reflected in the Marshall Plan document, along the lines of 
poststructural theory of policy as a social, discursively interlinked field which will 
be presented in more detain in the coming chapters. 
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As presented in the introduction, the plan was presented at a geopolitical time 
of political instability in Europe largely due to the large number of refugees and 
migrants arriving in Europe. For Germany, who had taken in a large number of 
refugees fleeing the war in Syria, the youth unemployment and large number of 
displaced groups in Africa became an extra incentive to formulate a solution to 
hamper the migration streams (Reuters 2016). 
The Marshall Plan is a living product which have been subject to commentary 
from academia, politics, business sector, religious groups and people and 
organisations with connections to German development initiatives among others 
(BMZ 2018). Out of the selection of these available on the ministry’s website, not 
one is from an African academic, politician or organisation. The lack of the other 
perspective in the constructive comments for an intercontinental partnership is not 
defended or justified by the BMZ, presenting the reader with the assumption that 
it was not thought about or at least not considered an issue. However, other 
sources show African leaders’ approval of the plan, although neglecting critical 
voices of the civil society medial space to express their views (Schwikowski 
2017). 
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2 Theoretical Framework 
In this section, I will go over the main theories used to analyse the text and 
provide an overview of the current research on the topic of this paper. The chosen 
theories, poststructuralism, eurocentrism and political myth, are chosen based on 
their potential to highlight different structural messages of the text. They are 
based on similar, if not the same, ontological and epistemological assumptions, 
making them compliable. In the next chapter, 3 Method, I will elaborate more on 
how they are combined to construct a chart for analysis. 
2.1 Previous Research 
Discourse analysis and poststructuralism as a research field are relatively new in 
comparison to classic IR schools such as realism, but it has nevertheless become 
an established genre in modern IR theorising. Well known authors apart from the 
ones used in this research include Foucault, Laclau & Mouffe and Derrida 
(Hansen 2006: xvi-xvii, 2-3). 
Analysis of the discourse in foreign aid has previously been conducted in the 
academic sphere. Whereas a lot of attention has been aimed at scrutinising the 
foreign policy discourse of the U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon countries in relation 
to their respective foreign aid recipients (see e.g. Regilme 2018; Grant & Nijman 
1997; Cawley 2015; and Mawdsley 2017), other regions and political units have 
been subject to analysis as well (see e.g. Hook & Zhang 1998, Burghart 2017, and 
Kim 2016 for East-Asia; and Büthe, Major & Suoza 2012 for aid in the private 
sector). Research regarding Germany’s foreign aid has previously examined the 
geo-strategic motives behind the aid (Dreher, Nunnenkamp & Schmaljohann 
2015), as well as looked at Germany’s Africa Policy and how their national 
identity is created in contrast to Africa (Engel 2012). 
Regarding the subject of choice in this research, the Marshall Plan with 
Africa, very few academic contributions have been published about the current 
document seeing as it was announced only in the beginning of last year, 2017 (see 
e.g. Schmieg 2017 for comments on the plan). However, the very idea of a new 
Marshall Plan in the 21st century has been scrutinised and debated in the 
academic sphere for over a decade, presented in short in the next paragraph. But 
how, when and most notably if a renewal of such an extensive foreign aid plan is 
to be enacted has remained contested. 
Paul Collier, among others, has argued that the developmental constraints 
Africa has been facing are mainly political and that foreign investment thus 
should be paired with domestic reform (Collier & Dollar 2000). Other claim that 
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massive flows of foreign aid to Africa are, because of the poor results in the 
1980’s and intricate ties to different donors with commercial interests, a waste of 
money (see e.g. Dowden 2005). Finally, some acknowledges that aid historically 
has had a positive impact on African countries, but that political change is needed 
and must come from within the countries themselves with only limited outside 
support (see e.g. Lockwood 2005). The idea of a new Marshall Plan has also been 
presented with other regions in mind (see e.g. Smith 2011 for The Middle East). 
To the extent of my knowledge, a profound discourse analysis with the current 
document in focus has not yet been published, and it is this gap in the research 
this paper aims to fill. 
2.2 Poststructuralism, Identity and Foreign Policy 
This study sets out from a poststructuralist worldview, placing identity, foreign 
policy and discourses at the centre of attention. In contrast to structuralism, 
poststructuralism does not view structures as fixed and consistent. Rather, the 
position implies that language and communication ascribe meaning to objects and 
circumstances, which in turn constantly shapes and reshapes our understanding of 
our surroundings. With this reasoning, language construct, reconstruct and reflect 
power relations and is thus inherently political (Hansen 2006: 1, 17; Jørgenssen & 
Phillips 2002: 8-12). One of the most recognised poststructuralism scholars in 
foreign policy and identity research is Lene Hansen, whose academic 
contributions will be used as theoretical foundation for this research. 
Poststructuralism falls under the broader field of social constructivism which 
recognises four key premises. First, knowledge is not and should not be regarded 
and treated as an objective truth. The world is only accessible to us through 
categorical representations delivered by language, which will here be referred to 
as products of discourse. Second, our understandings of the world are a product of 
our historical and cultural discourses, meaning that our knowledge could have 
been different had we been subject to different discourses. Third, building on the 
second point, the knowledge we have about the world and how we regard it is 
created and managed by social processes which in turn create and maintain social 
hierarchies. Finally, the fourth key principle in social constructivism points out 
the way discourse allow some actions whilst prohibit other, which gives the social 
construction of knowledge, truth and power real social effects (Jørgenssen & 
Phillips 2002: 5-6). 
The definitions of discourse used in this paper are amongst the most common 
in the poststructural school and reads as follows from a higher level of abstraction 
to a lower: “language use as a social practice”; the “kind of language used within 
a specific field” for a less abstract definition, referring to political discourse for 
example; and finally “a way of speaking which gives meaning to experiences 
from a particular perspective” (Jørgenssen & Phillips 2002: 66-7). Viewing 
discourse as a social act thus has it play a part in how we conceive knowledge 
(ibid.: 5). Language is defined here according to Fairclough’s three-dimensional 
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model as a communicative event with three parts: a text, which can be a text as 
such but also a speech or image; the discursive practice involving the production 
and consumption of the text(s) in question; and finally the social practice 
produced when the discursive mechanism works in combination with other 
mechanisms (ibid.: 68, 71). 
Viewing language as social, the school of thought sees how it is a collective 
matter of connecting certain sounds to particular objects, functions and feelings. It 
is simultaneously political, as it is an arena for the production and reproduction of 
certain subjectivities and identities whilst at the same time excluding other, 
making the portrayal and allotted space of different experiences in history and 
policy narratives critical. Language could also be understood as a series of 
juxtapositions, where all things are constantly valued in relation to something else 
(Hansen 2006: 18-19). Identities are no exception from this relational valuing. 
Poststructuralism views identity as discursive, relational and social, meaning 
that identity is constructed through language, in relation to an Other and 
established through collectively expressed and understood codes. Identity is also 
perceived as political, separating it from anthropological understandings of 
identity as culture (Hansen 2006: 6). Identities are not necessarily exclusively 
positive or negative; two identities can have essential societal roles according to 
dominant norm discourses but simultaneously be described as the antithesis to the 
other (ibid.: 21). The process of constructing identity by enhancing own 
characteristics in relation to an Other is called linking and differentiating. Linking 
means that particular characteristics and events are positively or directly linked to 
an object, whereas differentiating portrays how each characteristic is 
simultaneously negatively linked to the opposite characteristic of the Other (ibid.: 
19-21). 
Applying these assumptions to foreign policy, it becomes evident how 
poststructuralism, in contrast to for example constructivism or liberalism, view 
state identity as dependant on discursive practices exercised in foreign policy and 
sees how foreign policy discourse always presents a Self in relation to one or 
more Others when constructing problems1, objects and subjects (ibid.: 1, 6, 21-
24). The discursive practices are in turn dependant on previous policy. The policy 
discourse is also social, as it aims to convince an audience of both the political 
opposition and the public of the legitimacy of the problems and solutions, and 
thus institutionalise the identity representations in question (ibid.: 1). It is in 
foreign policy discourse that the linking between (ethical) state identity and policy 
can be studied (ibid.: 51). 
Finally, foreign policy is not situated in a vacuum. Rather, it is part of an 
intertextual web of knowledge and representations where it both builds upon the 
problem and identity framings of previous policy and public understandings as 
well as acts as the foundation of prior knowledge for future policy (ibid.: 7, 56-7). 
                                                                                                                                                        
 
1  A further elaboration on problem constructions in foreign policy is presented in section 3.1.1 What’s the 
problem represented to be?. 
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It is in this context my research takes off, viewing the political proposal of the 
Marshall Plan with Africa as a link in an intertextual, interdiscursive chain, where 
it draws on expressions and understandings used in previous texts in this 
particular political field. These previous texts has in turn both been influenced and 
influenced political events, making the text in question a sum of the discursive 
practices and development in that field. These previous discourses are then 
assumed to have affected the representations of the Self and the Other and the 
problem in the document (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002: 73-4; Hansen 2006: 56-7). 
2.3 Eurocentrism & Development 
With the poststructural assumptions in mind, this next section will regard 
eurocentrism which will be a central theme in the study of problem 
representations and identities in the Marshall Plan with Africa. 
Defined by Silvia Rodríguez Maeso and Marta Araújo as 
 
(…) a paradigm for interpreting a (past, present and future) reality that uncritically 
establishes the idea of European and Western historical progress/achievement and 
its political and ethical superiority, based on scientific rationality and the 
construction of the rule of law (Rodríguez Maeso & Araújo 2015: 1). 
 
eurocentrism is highlighted as a product of favouring Western achievements 
historically, as well as affecting the way we consider international relations both 
today and in the future. The definition of eurocentrism that will be used in this 
study is the notion of viewing Europe and the West at large as advanced and 
placed at the centre of one’s worldview whereas the achievements of rest of the 
world are actively downplayed (Kerner 2018: 552). In other words, finding 
something to be Eurocentric does not necessarily mean that it is bad, or in the case 
of foreign aid harmful or unwanted. It does however by definition mean that it is 
centred on one way of looking at development and neglecting the possibility that 
other ways might be more successful.  
The historic aspect of the concept plays a central role as it 
 
(...) signifies that Europe and European values became a foundational source of 
meaning through which individuals, groups, and nations from the continent could 
develop attitudes based on emerging ideologies of racial, religious, cultural, or 
ethnic supremacy over the various indigenous peoples that they encountered during 
the period from about 1450 (Lowy 1995: 714-5). 
 
In development policy and international cooperation, this assumes that since the 
West has had the power to define values and progress, it continuously centres 
itself ahead of the non-West in development terms (Sardar 1999: 44). Continued, 
eurocentrism is generally understood to rest on seven main principles in history 
narratives spilling over on development policy (Mazrui 2009: xi; Sardar 1999: 
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45ff). First, there is a bias of euro-heroism, meaning that Western inventions and 
achievements receive disproportional attention in contrast to the creations rest of 
the world. Following this is euro-mitigation, the habit of covering up or 
downplaying the crimes committed by Europeans or Westerners throughout 
history. Third, euro-exclusivity, means that history books tend to focus on the 
Western view of history, neglecting the experiences by others (Mazrui 2009: xi-
xii). 
The fourth pillar is based on how eurocentrism affects other cultures, namely 
how it effectively downplays achievements of other cultures. Fifth, the 
Eurocentric trend also takes it a step further from downplaying the achievements 
of other people and cultures than the Westerns by also exaggerating their faults 
and sins. The sixth Eurocentric bias marks the other side of the third, highlighting 
the very limited space allotted cultures beside the Western in history narratives. 
Finally, the seventh bias takes place within the study of other cultures, by for 
example dividing historical epochs after European standards (ibid.: xiii-xvi). 
Following the poststructural understanding of how language recreates power 
structures, these Eurocentric themes in history narratives has and will 
continuously spill over on policy making and thus recreate Western development 
as the norm. Based on this theory, the very notion of development would be an 
instrument for the West to make sure that the future of the ‘non-developed’ world 
would be the present of the West (Sardar 1999: 46-47). To provide the tools to 
better analyse the Marshall Plan with Africa in order to examine whether it holds 
Eurocentric biases, the next part will look into different categories of 
eurocentrism. 
Eurocentrism in the study of political science and humanities came to receive 
public attention with the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism from 1978, in 
which he, among other things, criticises the overwhelming emphasis on Western 
experiences in history and Othering of non-western experiences (Said 2003). In 
this study, however, a more defined way to approach eurocentrism will be used to 
complement the seven pillars and help create an analytical framework. 
In his book The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics (2012), John M. 
Hobson too identifies several Eurocentric myths, but angled in a way that aligns 
with the poststructural theoretical view presented in the previous section. In his 
text, Hobson presents the field of IR as both “defender and promoter of Western 
civilization” (2012: 14) and elaborates how the discipline helps entrench the 
Eurocentric worldview in the study of international politics. Some striking 
arguments are that the very field builds theories mainly on historical events in 
Europe but claimed to be founded on a positivistic and value-free base; how the 
debates within the field are portrayed as ‘great’ when in reality they stem from the 
same Eurocentric narratives; most theories use nation-states as the primary 
entities, discursively cementing their central role; globalisation has been 
politically constructed  in different ways, one trend among scholars being the 
opportunity to remake the  world along Western lines; and finally the tendency to 
ahistorically trace major IR schools back several centuries, ascribing them 
legitimacy through consistency (Hobson 2012: 14ff). 
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When engaging in the study of eurocentrism, the assumption is often that IR 
will be studied solely from an imperialist view. Hobson tries to stray away from 
that assumption by taking Said’s analysis of orientalism and Othering a step 
further and identifies four different categories within eurocentrism, illustrated 
with the four-way matrix below. 
 
(Hobson 2012: 5) 
 
First, the different ways eurocentrism takes place throughout history and between 
distinguished scholars are divided into Eurocentric institutionalism and scientific 
racism. The first is based on understandings of the world and world order from 
institutional and cultural factors rather than biological. Scholars and historians 
which fall under this categorisation of eurocentrism view all people and societies 
as capable of reason and progression from “savagery” into “civilisation” (Hobson 
2012: 3-5). Whether this could, and should, be done with the aid of the more 
civilised West, acts as the deciding principle for the second sub categorisation, 
pro- contra anti-imperialist. A Eurocentric institutionalist with a pro-imperialist 
viewpoint would in this theory be labelled paternalist, characterised by the 
philosophy that it is the duty of the developed West to assist less developed 
societies on the path to modernity by delivering European institutions to 
accelerate the development (ibid.: 6). Regardless of division, the common 
denominator for Eurocentric institutionalism, in Hobson’s experience, is that 
development is linear and the civilisation standard of the West is higher than that 
of the non-western world, making the Western level of development regarded as 
the norm which ought to be achieved (ibid.). 
Paired with an anti-imperialist opinion, the Eurocentric institutionalist would 
instead be labelled anti-paternalist, highlighting the auto-developmental 
characteristics of all societies, and therefore the lack of need for a Western 
intervention. In this view, the West has pioneered development towards 
civilisation because of phenomenal institutional capabilities, but all societies will 
naturally follow this path at some point in history (ibid.). 
Scientific racism, on the other hand, enhances genetics and biology as 
determining factors to if and which societies can reach a civilisation of modern, 
Western, standard. As Hobson notes, this field is much more heterogeneous than 
that of Eurocentric institutionalism (ibid.: 6-7). 
In international politics, the very idea and measurements of development can 
be traced to a Eurocentric ideal of Western capitalism. Taking the example of 
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economic growth which is a common way to measure development, it rests on the 
capitalist ideal of profit through capitalisation of labour and resources. This model 
is often criticised for in itself being environmentally unsustainable as it 
encourages accumulation of capital and thus the exploitation of natural resources 
(Mehmet 1995). As outlined in Hobson’s analysis of eurocentrism, the Western 
societal model based on capitalism is seen as superior in Eurocentric narratives. 
The strive to implement Western norms and institutions in the rest of the world is 
sometimes referred to as westernisation (see e.g. Mehmet 1999). 
2.3.1 Myth of Europe 
The third theory used in this research as aid to analyse the Marshall plan with 
Africa is very much connected to eurocentrism, namely political myth and more 
specifically the Myth of Europe. This is to highlight how the policy authors, from 
West, portray Europe in relation to other geographic or political divisions of the 
Earth and how that affects the intended partnership. 
A myth in the study of IR is the process around a particular narrative which 
simplifies the understandings of the subjects’ surroundings by creating 
dichotomies between Us and Them. Whereas myths are narratives, not all 
narratives are myths. A myth requires certain reception and significance, and it is 
the process of production, reception and reproduction that creates the process 
which is the work on and of myth (Bottici & Challand 2010: 90-1). A political 
myth resonates with political conditions and affects different social groups by 
reproducing significance shared by the group in question and address the political 
circumstances in which the group exists. Rather than attempting to describe the 
world, political myths oftentimes construct a new one, and invite the subjects to 
take action. This can often make myths self-fulfilling prophecies (ibid.: 92). 
Common political myths of Europe stem from the ancient Greek mythology of 
the heroine Europa, tied in with historical narratives of the superior intellectual 
heritage from the classical times (ibis. 102-4). Some specific European identities 
recognised in these myths are among others the “(...) myth of Europe as a vehicle 
for peace and prosperity (...)” (ibid.: 3) and Europe as “(...) the promised land of 
wellbeing and modernity (...)”, often symbolised by a train both in images and 
metaphors in political speeches (ibid.: 107). 
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3 Method 
The main methods used in this research are discourse analysis and policy analysis, 
narrowed down to a framework for analysis based on the writings of Lene 
Hansen, Carol Bacchi and discourse methodology scholars. Discourse analysis is 
first presented in broader terms, followed by an even more concrete approach to 
policy analysis in particular before rounding up to a chart for analysis combining 
the theories and methods presented. 
3.1 Discourse Analysis 
Discourse analysis is based on the poststructural understanding of language as an 
active agent in shaping our understandings of the world as described in section 2.1 
Poststructuralism, Identity and Foreign Policy, making it both a method and a 
theory in itself. As a method in political science, discourse analysis is a way of 
analysing and displaying discursive patterns and varieties in language (Jørgenssen 
& Phillips 2002: 1). The preferred way of performing the analysis itself differs 
between poststructural scholars. The way used here, presented in the next two 
sections, follows the critical discourse analysis school by investigating power 
relationships constructed through discourses in order to present material on which 
critique and proposal for social change can be formed (ibid.: 2). 
Viewing discourse as not only a form of practice to shape and reshape 
structures but also as an active reflection of the current structures thus reveals the 
existing structures and assumptions the policy writers of Marshall Plan with 
Africa base their policy suggestion on (ibid: 61). 
3.1.1 What’s the problem represented to be? 
The very founding assumption policy making is based on is that there are 
problems in need of solving and that policy thus serves as the fixing mechanism. 
Policy makers, in turn, become the fixers, solving the issue and bringing about 
change. From a poststructural point of view, this puts a lot of pressure on the 
policy makers’ understanding of the problem and their knowledge of the field, as 
well as the representations available in previous policy. This shows how 
‘problems’ are endogenous, created within the policy making process, rather than 
exogenous and existing autonomously in society as often assumed in policy 
analysis. In other words, following this line of reasoning, we are governed by 
problematisations which need to be scrutinised. 
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The goal of using Carol Bacchi’s method of analysing policy, “What’s the 
problem represented to be”, is thus to problematise the problematisations in 
policies by asking interrogative questions to the text and the findings (Bacchi 
2009: ix-xvi). Her six-step method is created to highlight both the problem, its 
background and context, and its effects. The questions posed by Bacchi reads as 
follows: 
 
1. “What’s the ‘problem’ (...) represented to be in a specific policy? 
2. What presuppositions or assumptions underlie this representation of the 
‘problem’? 
3. How has this representation of the problem come about? 
4. What is left unproblematic in this problem representation? Where are the 
silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently? 
5. What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? 
6. How/where has this representation of the ‘problem’ been produced, 
disseminated and defended? How could it be questioned, disrupted and 
replaced?” 
(Bacchi 2009: p. xii) 
 
In this research, I am interested in uncovering Eurocentric biases in the policy 
document in question by looking at problem representations, identity 
constructions and the potential silences in and effects of these findings. In order to 
do so, I have created a customised framework for analysis to approach the policy 
in question, based on some, but not all of Bacchi’s questions. The relevant 
questions for my research are one, two, four and five, presented in more detail 
below. An elaboration on how these chosen questions from Bacchi are then paired 
with theory to create an analytical framework is available in the next section. 
Question one sets of the analysis by clarifying the problem formulation posed 
by the policy maker(s). Starting backwards in a way, the solution can help clarify 
what ‘problem’ the policy has aimed to solve (ibid.: 2-4). 
Once the dominant problem representations are identified, question two aims 
to investigate and illuminate what logics, worldview and contextual 
understandings underpins them. Here a lot of identity construction from 
poststructural theory is tied in, as for example the construction and understanding 
of an Other through linking and differentiation (ibid.: 4-8). 
The goal of question three is to clarify competing problem representations by 
considering the social context an political opposition, and as the purpose of the 
research is to focus on the Eurocentric features of only the Marshall Plan with 
Africa, it is left out from the analysis in order to leave room for deeper analysis on 
the, for this study, more relevant questions. 
Having presented the problem representation(s) and the logics and worldview 
on which it rests, question four encourages to look at what is left out. In other 
words, its objective is to problematise what is not problematised. A good starting 
point here is to look at the dichotomous identity representations and problem 
representation context from question two, and seeing what may be oversimplified 
(ibid.: 12-14). Here, as further presented in the next chapter, theories of 
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eurocentrism will help remind of perspectives from other cultures which may 
illuminate culturally fixed ways of thinking about institutions and values. 
 Finally, question five evaluates the effects of these problem 
representation(s), identifying potential winners and losers, benefits and harms in 
order to facilitate critical assessment of the policy. It appraises what is likely to 
change or stay the same. The question is divided in three interlinked kinds of 
effects: 
 
1. “Discursive effects: effects which follow from the limits imposed on what can 
be thought and said; 
2. Subjectification (or ‘subjectivisation’) effects: the way in which subjects and 
subjectivities are constituted in discourse; 
3. Lived effects: The impact on life and death.” (ibid.: 15). 
3.2 Framework for Analysis 
By combining the theories with discourse analysis narrowed down to the chosen 
parts of Bacchi’s method mentioned above, this section presents a customised 
framework for analysis which will guide the analysis, and thus aid the reader in 
reviewing its credibility, in the next chapter. The framework is divided into two 
section, the first scrutinising the discourse in the document and the second 
reviewing the findings of the first section. To spare the reader from excessive 
jumping back and forth between my analysis and the document, the analysis in 
section one is presented from the top to the bottom of the document, guiding the 
reader through the structure and main content of the document by commenting on 
it briefly. Potential repetitions will however be disregarded unless the context 
provides different meanings to the statements. 
The first section will look at the problem representation in accordance with 
Bacchi’s method, tying in question one and two by examining the problem 
representation based on Eurocentric theory of foreign politics and the political 
myths of Europe. Hobson’s four-way matrix of dividing eurocentrism, if 
applicable, will be used to map the assumptions creating the problem 
representation. As mentioned in the previous chapter, this section will also clarify 
some identity assumptions based on poststructural identity theory of self and 
othering. Specific features I will look for in the text to illuminate this is thus how 
linking and differentiating is performed with Europe and Africa in mind, as well 
as the geopolitical origin of the ideas presented. 
Regarding the problem representation I will look at what the goals with the 
partnership or foreign aid plan is and move backwards from there to uncover the 
circumstantial understandings of issues in need of solving. In the goal 
formulations I will look specifically at how the policy writers portray the 
developmental expectations for both Europe and Africa in order to examine how 
development and the respective institutions are viewed and valued, based on 
Eurocentric theory. Both findings that point out Eurocentric as well as non-
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Eurocentric views will be presented throughout the analysis to present the whole, 
nuanced picture. 
The second section then looks at the results from section one and aims to 
identify the silences, using elements from Bacchi’s question four and five. Here, a 
deeper analysis of what is left out of this problematisation is presented premised 
on the critique of Eurocentric development ideals and how language and foreign 
policy are based off previous policy and understandings of problems. I will pay 
extra attention to agency and how the historic relations between the continents are 
portrayed and approached, if they are commented on at all. 
The section will end analysing the discursive and subjectification effects of the 
problem formulations, using the two first questions under question five in 
Bacchi’s method. 
3.3 Material 
Primary material will be the official policy blueprint for the partnership, Marshall 
Plan with Africa. Even though it is in its starting phase, the document is deemed 
to be sufficient as it in itself proclaims to identify both problems, solutions and 
cooperation potential, making it ideal for this type of research (BMZ 2017: 4). As 
this research aims to examine whether there are Eurocentric features in problem 
representation and solution suggestions or not, the project being in its starting 
phase is viewed as a pro rather than a con as it makes the findings potentially 
useful for policy makers to consider. Additional documents, such as the Compact 
with Africa, are excluded as it consists only of two pages with the same main 
content as the Marshall Plan with Africa. 
The English versions of the originally German documents are used as to avoid 
unnecessary translation errors in direct quotes. As the English version is published 
on BMZ’s official website as well, it is in this research deemed just as qualified. 
However, the language and phrasings between the documents have been 
compared, should there be any linguistic particularities. 
Secondary material will be political documents leading up to the Marshall 
Plan blueprint published in 2017 as well as published commentary and political 
statements regarding it to display the context and highlight certain points. The 
framework policy documents presented in the introduction from 2014, 2015 and 
2016 are the only published framework documents for Africa policy available on 
the BMZ website and were thus presented to create an image of the previous 
policy. Finally, academic articles and books focused on either theory, method or 
the case in question are used throughout the research. These are chosen based 
primarily on their relevance to the subject, but consideration has been put to their 
recency as well as compatibility to assure a close knitted framework for analysis. 
Criticism to the theories have been left out of this paper as it is beyond the scope 
of this research to engage in an epistemological and ontological debated. Criticism 
has nevertheless been considered, and the interested can find critique of 
poststructuralism in e.g. Culler 1987 and defence of it in e.g. Wenman 2017 and 
  15 
Balarin 2008. For an even more nuanced revision of the theory, the interested can 
consider the 1971 debate between Chomsky and Foucault (Elders 2011). 
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4 Analysis 
The analysis presented below is divided into two sections as presented in chapter 
3.2 Framework for Analysis. The first looks at problem representations and 
solutions in the text, following the document from start to bottom. The second 
section then turns to analyse the silences in the document as well as discuss some 
potential effects from the problem representations and solutions presented, based 
on the theoretical framework. 
 
4.1 Problem Representations and Solutions 
The policy document is divided into five chapters and an introduction, each with 
specific problem representations, solutions and arguments for a closer partnership. 
Here, each chapter will be analysed according to the framework for analysis, 
identifying problem representations and solutions as well as identity 
representations. 
The introduction presents the reader with a brief background to the 
relationship between the continents and their mutual potential gains from an 
outlined partnership, but also the risks of not engaging in closer cooperation. It 
highlights the nature of the document, that it is a living product based on the need 
for new solutions to the new challenges that Africa is facing, inviting everyone to 
take part in shaping the new partnership agreement between the continents (BMZ 
2017a: 4). 
Here, the problems are not yet specifically outlined. However, one can already 
hint at identity construction through linking and differentiating. In the very first 
paragraph of the document, the joint responsibility for the challenges facing 
Africa is stressed, as those will affect Europe as well. 
 
How successfully we manage the major challenges that lie ahead will decide not 
only the future and the fate of Africa – both its people and its natural environment – 
but also the future of Europe (BMZ 2017a: 4). 
 
There is no recognition of the opposite relationship, that Europe is facing 
challenges which may inflict negatively on Africa, and thus benefit from a 
partnership as well (ibid.). This directly links Africa to challenges, and Europe to 
the reliever of those. 
The third paragraph then connects this policy proposal to the original Marshall 
Plan, identifying that the challenges are not entirely comparable, but that Africa is 
  17 
nevertheless in need of the same effort that helped Europe out of their misery after 
the Second World War. This adds to the identity construction reflected on in the 
last paragraph, seeing how Europe is now beyond crisis whereas Africa is 
discursively placed in the developmental situation Europe was in almost 70 years 
ago. Tying in theories of eurocentrism in political narratives, this presents a 
Eurocentric view of development as linear, with the West as frontrunners. Using 
Hobson’s chart, this would so far suggest a Eurocentric paternalist approach. 
Despite this, there is nevertheless strong highlight on how the partnership 
must be an integrated effort with focus on African solutions to African problems, 
particularly supporting the commitments of the African Union’s (AU) “Agenda 
2063” which actively gives agency to the AU and instead removes paternal 
features (ibid.). This is further acknowledged by inviting a discussion about the 
plan, which was commented on in the introduction of this paper. 
The two pages before the first chapter of the document are devoted to the ten 
starting points (10 Thesen) of the proposal, circling the main focus areas. The first 
starting point acknowledges the need for a new agreement between Europe and 
Africa, focusing however only on problems on Africa’s continent. 
 
Africa’s population is set to double by 2050. It will then be home to 20 per cent of 
all people in the world. Ensuring that hundreds of millions of young Africans have 
enough food, energy and jobs and that their natural resources are protected presents 
massive challenges but also opportunities (BMZ 2017a: 5). 
 
Europe is mentioned only in the last sentence, portrayed as agents combating 
Africa’s issues, “European countries in particular can play a role in tackling these 
massive challenges by offering their knowledge, innovations and technological 
advances and getting directly involved.” (BMZ 2017a: 5). Tying in the theoretical 
framework, this would add to the Eurocentric paternalist category of eurocentrism 
suggested above as well as link development to technological advancements, 
which historically has been a Western measure of development (Sardar 1999: 47). 
The second thesis looks at Africa’s need for African solutions and 
congratulates the forming of AU. It also emphasises how Germany and Europe 
must look at what Africa has to say and build a corporation upon that, which is 
interpreted here as taking a step away from the paternalistic eurocentrism (BMZ 
2017a: 5). 
Following this the third point highlights the needs of Africa’s youth, 
especially targeting the need for job and training opportunities. The main 
challenge here is presented as delivering the required economic institutions to 
Africa, showing signs of Eurocentric institutionalism as other institutions or 
solutions are not considered. 
 
Developing the necessary economic structures and creating new employment and 
training opportunities will be the central challenge. Africa’s young people also need 
contact and interaction with Europe. Europe must develop a strategy that allows for 
legal migration whilst combating irregular migration and people smuggling (BMZ 
2017a: 5). 
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As the economic cooperation between the continents is a priority in the Marshall 
Plan, it is natural for the policy makers to want as similar institutions as possible 
to ease the transcontinental economic agreements. It is nevertheless a Eurocentric 
assumption that the well-established Western institutions would perform better 
than other. This third point also presents Europe’s need to revise their migration 
laws to enable legal migration whilst combating illegal migration (ibid.). The 
theme of migration is a reoccurring theme for the portrayal of European struggles, 
which ties in the self-image of Europe as a promised land characterised by peace 
and prosperity. 
Fourth, emphasis is put on the private-sector as a creator of jobs and how 
Africa needs private investment rather than subsidies. In order for it to happen, 
must, according to the document, the environment become more attractive and 
safer for investors. The latter is suggested through developing the instruments to 
mobilise investment, but the attractive environment lacks concrete solution 
representations. This will be subject for another, economically focused research 
project to examine more thoroughly, but from a Eurocentric point of view, it 
appears to be focused on a Western liberal capitalist societal model. 
The fifth point argues for the diversification of the African economy, moving 
away from a commodity dominated economy, and Europe’s role in this is to 
improve the access to the EU single market and break up trade barriers (ibid: 6). 
As will be summed up in the end of this chapter, this specific solution 
responsibility from Europe’s side is a reoccurring trend. 
The sixth point looks at political rights which will also be analysed deeper 
later in the text as it is given a specific chapter. 
On the seventh point it is expressed that the development cooperation will 
favour the countries which show the greater incentive to implement reforms 
regarding “(...) good governance, protection of human rights and economic 
developments” (ibid.: 6). Although this in itself is Eurocentric, as it implicitly 
says that the partnership will favour those who are the fastest to transition into 
more Western like societies, it is a positive shift from the pan-Africa discourse 
used throughout the document, lumping all African countries into one. 
Eighth, the need for reforms also in Europe and on a global level are 
recognised in order to match the proposed African ones, turning away for a 
moment for the responsibilities of Africa. However, the examples in the paragraph 
are all focused on economics, highlighting the need for Europe to stop illicit 
financial flows and instead focus on fair trade, and not so much on cultural or 
social issues. 
Private investment is emphasized again in the ninth point, recognising the 
limits of ODA and instead focusing on the possibilities private investment will 
bring to African countries, facilitated by ODA. 
Finally, the tenth thesis points out that Germany will take their shared 
responsibility for the least developed countries, providing basic needs for people 
and meeting the challenges and possibilities of urbanisation. Girls and women are 
here given extra attention, which correlates with some of the comments on the 
website from UN Women Germany and Plan International Germany, showing 
  19 
responsiveness of the policy makers (ibid.; BMZ 2018). If this sensitivity to 
outside views is reflected for comments from African representatives as well, the 
Marshall Plan has great potential to become the inclusive framework it aspires to 
be (BMZ 2017a: 4). 
4.1.1 Values and Assets 
In the first chapter, called “Africa - Europe’s partner continent”, historical 
relations are briefly reviewed before covering the values which serve as base for 
the partnership and possibilities of the African continent. The historical narrative 
presents responsibility for the sufferings of African countries and acknowledges 
how the wealth of industrialised countries is partly due to the exploitation of 
resources and slavery, presenting a more nuanced identity portrayal (BMZ 2017a: 
7). 
When covering values, the very first sentence claims that the cooperation is 
“(...) based on values and guided by common interests.” (ibid.). The values are 
thus not claimed to necessarily be shared, which is demonstrated by exemplifying 
the values with the first sentence in the German basic law (German constitution), 
stating that the human value is sacrosanct („Die Würde des Menschen ist 
unantastbar“), followed up by the moral obligations following the European 
humanist heritage without presenting corresponding values expressed in an 
African environment (BMZ 2017b). It is then however enhanced how the 
partnership represents mutual respect between the parts. 
 
A Marshall Plan with Africa also symbolises achievement and mutual respect. It is 
guided by the interests of Africa and Europe. In the long term and as neighbours, we 
can either prosper together or suffer together (BMZ 2017a: 7). 
 
However, this is somewhat undermined by the fact that at this point in the 
document, no reference to any comment or source with a representative from an 
African country acknowledging this policy idea has been presented. Still, the 
value of the paragraph is respecting African agency which in itself is a withdrawal 
from eurocentrism. 
The problem representations in this chapter are mainly the poor use of 
Africa’s assets, both resource wise but also the diverse cultural and religious 
assets to provide social services. Also, some self-critique is presented as one of 
the problems are identified as Europe’s previous short term economic approach 
and how multinational companies are avoiding taxes. Finally, it is recognised how 
the appropriate structures has not been implemented, causing previous projects to 
fail. Boiled down to their core, the problem is identified as the lack of jobs and 
opportunities for Africa’s youth which is making them turn to look at Europe for 
more prosperous futures (BMZ 2017a: 8-10). This correlates to certain extent with 
Eurocentric institutionalism and the political myth of Europe as the promised 
land. 
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Solutions, or rather goal formulations, find women and minorities’ agency in 
politics central, but the catchy phrase that it is the women of Africa that “(...) hold 
the key to the continent’s future in their hands” (ibid.: 8) is not paired with any 
suggestions of cross continental cooperation for equality, indirectly hinting that 
corruption and exclusion from politics are problems of Africa’s, not in Europe. At 
the end of the chapter, it is once again emphasised how the project will build on 
the African ideas laid out in Agenda 2063 (ibid.). 
4.1.2 The Three Pillars 
The next two chapters presents the three pillars of the Marshall Plan, highlighting 
prioritised areas which fall under the categories Economic Activity, Peace and 
Security and Democracy and the Rule of Law (BMZ 2017a: 12). A lot of them 
reflect back on the ten starting points presented earlier and will thus not be 
analysed again. 
Before diving into the problems and solution suggestions of the pillars, 
Africa’s status in the world politics is commented on, presenting how they on the 
basis of their potential, challenges and interconnectedness with the global 
economy and security should have a higher priority in international political 
forums. 
 
At the same time, we must stop speaking on behalf of Africa. Africa can speak for 
itself. That is why Africa should gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council 
and be represented in other international organisations in a way that reflects its 
increased importance (BMZ 2917a: 14). 
 
The proposal of a permanent seat for Africa in the Security Council is here viewed 
as highlighting the agency of African countries, although it at first sight seems 
like a Western slur labelling Africa as a country. It could in fact be interpreted as 
norm breaking move to suggest a non-state member to the Security Council which 
has previously consisted of nation states, challenging Western agency in 
international institutions (ibid.). 
The first pillar recognises the main problems as youth unemployment and a 
non-diverse economy, as previously presented. Here, the solutions are more 
slightly more defined than in the introductory sections of the documents, with 
specific undertakings presented for Africa, Germany and globally. The main 
solutions nevertheless follow the line Western institutions as well as an 
encouragement for Africa to ratify agreements connected to less red tape in 
business and trade, such as the WTO Trade Facilitation Agreement (ibid.). Other 
suggestions remain quite vague. For example, “[i]mprove the environment for 
doing business” can only be analysed in based on the context, which has proven to 
favour Western models, and thus it can only be assumed that this refers to a 
westernisation of the way business is made in Africa (ibid.). 
The second pillar looks at peace and security. The problem representations 
look exclusively at crises on the African continent, and the solutions follow the 
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same geographical division as the previous pillar with emphasis on how the 
international community can aid Africa in reaching peace and stability (ibid.: 19-
20). This again discursively places Europe in a paternal position, ready to aid 
Africa. The problem from a Eurocentric perspective is thus not that war and crisis 
are recognised as problems, rather that it is portrayed in a supposed partnership 
for mutual cooperation that this is an issue only Africa struggles with. 
The third pillar highlight the road towards in themselves Eurocentric values, 
namely democracy, rule of law and human rights, again reflecting on the pride 
Europe takes in their humanist heritage presented on page 7 in the document 
(ibid.: 7, 21). The problem representation is thus interpreted as the lack of these 
values in Africa. The solutions focus on, for Africa’s part, strengthening the trust 
to politicians and governments by for example raising the wages of civil servants 
in order to combat corruption, and strengthen transparency. From Germany’s side, 
one example not previously touched upon is to implement youth exchange similar 
to ERASMUS between EU member states (ibid.: 21). The latter exemplifies 
another European programme which the policy maker wants to transfer to the 
African context. 
4.1.3 Possibilities and Outlook 
Chapter four looks at possibilities regarding food and agriculture, protection of 
natural resources, energy and infrastructure, and education. This chapter is more 
on the technical side, and few additional findings of value than the ones already 
presented have been identified. The chapter does however present a more gender 
and sustainability aware discourse, when for example talking about the need of 
focusing on mothers and pregnant women to combat malnutrition and the 
investment in renewable energy sources (BMZ 2017a: 24-32). These are 
historically not Western values, seeing as Western capitalism has not favoured an 
abstemious approach to natural resource extraction (see chapter 2.3 
Eurocentrism) and equality still is a present political struggle. They do however 
reflect on the Sustainable Development Goals, Agenda 2030, and present an 
opportunity for Germany to fulfil their international responsibility, adding to their 
state identity (Global Goals 2018). 
Finally, chapter five presents an outlook for the future work on and 
implementation of the Marshall Plan. Here, conversations with both African 
leaders and representatives from the civil society are mentioned among other 
points, a positive remark from a Eurocentric point of view as it lays out the ideas 
for scrutiny by non-westerners (BMZ 2017a: 33). 
4.1.4 Summary 
Having gone through the blueprint for the Marshall Plan with Africa from top to 
bottom, some central, reoccurring features have been identified which will be 
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summarised before stepping into the second section of the analysis, reflecting on 
silences and effects. 
First, mindful that Eurocentric does not by definition mean malign, some but 
not all of the problem representations have been shown to rest on Eurocentric 
value grounds, placed in Eurocentric paternalism following Hobson’s chart. The 
most prominent examples are the one tracked approach to Western economic and 
societal institutions and values, and the very fact that the partnership is called 
Marshall Plan, discursively placing Africa in the post-Second World War state of 
Europe. 
Second, the suggested partnership focuses overwhelmingly on the struggles 
and possibilities of Africa, and those of Europe are undermined and linked to the 
effects of the African struggles, namely migrants. However, African actors are not 
reduced to issues of hunger, migration and crisis, but also acknowledged as agents 
throughout the document. Yet, the tools they would be presented with as agents 
following this document are based on a Western societal model, despite references 
to AU’s Agenda 2063. The problem representations and solutions could thus be 
boiled down to an issue of Africa not being enough like the West in order for 
Europe and Africa to have a successful economic partnership, and the solution for 
them to become more like West. Following Hansen’s theory on Othering in 
foreign policy, in some historical narratives it has been found to be part of a 
Eurocentric bias to strive for the Other to turn more like the Self (2006: 43). This 
finding frames what in the theory chapter was referred to as westernisation. 
Finally, the aim to give Africa agency to create their own solutions paired with 
these Eurocentric tendencies make interesting identity constructions. Reflecting 
back on the poststructural theory regarding policy discourse as social, the 
aspiration to move away from a donor and recipient relationship present in most 
solution representations could very well be a discursive aim to please uprising 
nationalist and protectionist political oppositions in Europe by restricting aid 
(BMZ 2017a: 13; Hansen 2006: 1, 56; Rinke 2017). The same goes for the notion 
to restrict light arm sales instead of cutting them completely. The support for 
Agenda 2063 and the efforts to make other states do the same reflects on the 
discursive construction of the ethical state identity of Germany (BMZ 2017a: 13). 
 
4.2 Effects and Silences 
Seeing as the document is a proposed partnership, implying mutual benefits, the 
greatest silence in the protocol is exactly what Germany expects Europe to gain 
out of this partnership. Some things have been presented briefly, as with the 
example of migration presented in the previous section, whereas others have been 
hinted, such as Africa’s opportunity of gaining access to the European single 
market. The latter implies that the opposite would be the case as well, giving 
Europe first hand access to the African market. Furthermore, the Chinese 
advances in Africa are not mentioned either, even though commentators many 
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times point out how it seems to be a new scramble for Africa emerging (see e.g. 
Poplak 2016; Al Jazeera 2014; and Pilling 2017). The historical relations are 
covered, with Europe taking some responsibility for the current state of their 
neighbour continent, an acknowledgement which humbles Western achievements 
and places them in a relational light. 
Another silence does however lie in lack of awareness of the growing 
migration to Africa from other continents (SVT 2018), and the gains for Europe 
from knowledge, cultural and social exchanges, a silence which effectively 
undermines African agency. Africa is trusted with agency to help themselves, 
aided by Europe, but seems not to be believed to provide valuable contributions to 
Europe. It is also worth noting, as one of the comments not published on BMZ’s 
website pointed out, how this partnership was not initiated by Africa 
(Schwikowski 2017). Seeing as the African Union Commission published a ten-
year implementation plan covering far more extensive implementation strategies 
for the solutions presented, one questions the need for a German/European 
initiative focused on aiding the same Agenda 2063 goals (African Union 
Commission: 108). For the solutions to be truly African as expressed in the 
Marshall Plan it would presumable have left room for African agents to 
incentivise a partnership if they found it suitable. This suggests a somewhat 
restless West wanting to hurry the development, creating a stable market suitable 
for established business models and curbing the migration flows. 
The main discursive effects from this policy document, framing what is 
allowed and normal contra prohibited and unimaginable, are thus confirming a 
Eurocentric view of what successful development and societal models ought to 
look like. Once more stressing how Eurocentric does not necessarily mean 
malign, few angles in the document has presented solutions not stemming from a 
Western societal model, knowledge or culture. As brought up earlier, Europe 
discursively claims to an identity of reliever and Africa the one in need of relief. 
However, by encouraging Agenda 2063, it also discursively plants seeds about 
African agency, which in future policy documents could be initiated by African 
agents, making them the subjects of change rather than objects. 
All in all, as this research does not set out to analyse economical or 
developmental effects but the discourse, the document has provided both sections 
of highly Eurocentric discourse and assumptions as well as more inclusive 
language. Reading the document in its entirety, as became clear in section one, 
many parts which were questioned in the beginning were clarified and less 
Eurocentric approaching the end. 
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5 Concluding Remarks 
This research has examined the problem formulations in Germany’s new proposed 
Africa policy named Marshall Plan with Africa. It finds that although African 
solutions and agency are encouraged, Western institutions and values acts as 
foundations for most policy suggestions, reflecting Eurocentric biases. The 
problem formulations are heavily focused on African issues despite the branding 
as a new partnership which creates asymmetrical identity representations where 
the main issues of West are presented as a small part of the effects of Africa’s 
challenges. The political myth of Europe as a vehicle for peace and prosperity 
seems to an ever-present theme in the relationship representations between the 
continents. 
Seeing as the document encourages the implementation of already outlined 
goal formulations by the African Union, the research has questioned the need for 
the West to incentivise a partnership, instead of leaving room for the opposite 
relationship. This, alongside the encouragement to award countries making faster 
progress towards the reforms suggested in the Marshall Plan suggests a restless 
West, impatient to have the necessary institutions and environment in place for 
them to make business more efficiently in Africa and inhibit migration to Europe. 
 
5.1 Future Research 
This paper has focused on presenting a profound policy discourse analysis of the 
document for future research and policy revisions to build upon. 
The next step continuing the analysis would be to first and foremost compare 
the findings presented here to those of another researcher, using the same theories 
and material in order to validate them. It also presents a starting point for research 
connecting the other questions in Bacchi’s method, looking at possible ways to 
disrupt the problem representations. 
A similar approach as the one used in this study could be used to analyse the 
policy suggestions in Agenda 2063 in order to situate the problem formulations to 
their geopolitical world views and compare the findings. Is Agenda 2063 biased 
by eurocentrism as well or do they highlight solutions with other origins? The 
results would lead to interesting follow up questions to the document analysed 
here, especially should there be findings contradicting the findings presented in 
this paper. It would undeniably be interesting to test if Hobson’s claims of 
Eurocentrism in the field of IR constituting our political knowledge of the world 
has transferred to the solutions in Agenda 2063, or if the solutions are a product of 
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a different problem representation stemming from an understanding of the world 
based on other historical and cultural discourses. 
Had the study allowed for more space and a larger financial scope, interviews 
with policy makers on these areas alongside an even more comprehensive analysis 
of previous documents could have given the findings additional support or 
presented a more heterogenous discourse. Finally, seeing as the project is still in 
its starting phase, research examining and evaluating the effects of the policy will 
be needed in the future. 
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